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Review Article
The Socialist Design
Urban Dilemmas in Postwar Europe and the Soviet
Union
ELIDOR MËHILLI

We programmed a system and it programmed us.1
—György Konrád, The City Builder

“We managed to rearrange the city down to the last grain of sand,” declares
György Konrád’s frantic, impassionate, obsessive, idealistic city builder.2
He has gone through all the trials of communist rule: a distinctly bourgeois
background, enchantment, postwar professional success, ambitious building
assignments, arrest, imprisonment, disenchantment, and, finally, release
from prison into a world without Stalin but still with total planning. His
unnamed socialist city, like Konrád’s text, is dense, polluted, sprawling, and
layered. The scale of urban planning appears both awesome and terrifying,
provoking in the builder disgust just as much as pride. One minute he is
mighty, with his bird’s eye view and 600 convicts working under him; the
next he is languishing in a Stalinist prison designed by his own father. His
bold plans for remaking the fabric of society seem to radically depart from
anything ever done before, yet they merely introduce “a modified system of
inequalities in place of older systems.”3 Both the provincial East European
city and its builder seem inextricably tied to the same fate. Indeed, at the
For inspiration, guidance, and criticisms, I am grateful to Stephen Kotkin. The article has
greatly benefited from the thoughtful suggestions of Jan Plamper, who closely read numerous
versions, and the editors of the journal. The research was made possible by generous support
from the Department of History at Princeton University and a Mellon predoctoral fellowship
at The George Washington University.
1
George [György] Konrád, The City Builder (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977),
82.
2
Ibid., 27.
3
Ibid., 96.
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 13, 3 (Summer 2012): 635–65.
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root of his delirious wanderings is the awareness that he—like any of his
drawings—is also a product of planning. This paradox of feeling power and
powerlessness, ambition mixed with resignation, pride with pessimism, while
being in control of everything yet seemingly ruled by the terms of others,
pervades the mind of the city builder, just as it does the system around him.
Taking a cue from two rigorous and insightful books—Stephen Bittner’s
account of the “many lives” of the Soviet Thaw and Greg Castillo’s study of
the Cold War as a series of battles in design and the domestic sphere—as
well as a recent explosion of interest among historians in the Khrushchev
era, “spatial history,” material culture, and East–West exchanges, this article
addresses the paradoxes of the Thaw as exemplified in urban form.4 It argues
for the interconnected nature of domestic, international, and Eastern bloclevel dynamics by viewing processes of the Thaw simultaneously from the
angles of neighborhood, city, and empire.5 These angles capture the evolving
relationship with the Soviet past, the expansion of the Cold War into
everyday city life, and the burgeoning exchange in knowledge, technology,
and planning instruments among socialist countries. More suggestive than
prescriptive, the choice of these three levels of analysis does not imply that the
concomitant processes were discrete from one another.6 Indeed, a number of
threads run throughout the essay: local battles over the meaning of socialist
material culture, with their unexpected turns and twists; the participation
of socialist planning in an international arena; but also, equally important,
the earnest effort to devise a common planning model and architectural
vocabulary across socialist space. The resulting “socialist design” was an
amalgam produced by formal and informal exchange, an institutionalized
logic of planning, invention, and imported technology, but also a selfinduced competition with the capitalist West. Bittner’s work, reviewed in
the first section of this article, elucidates the domestic dilemmas of the Soviet
4

See Stephen V. Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Memory in
Moscow’s Arbat (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); and Greg Castillo, Cold War on
the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2010).
5
On the broader interpretive implications of transnational approaches for Soviet history, see
Michael David-Fox, “The Implications of Transnationalism,” Kritika 12, 4 (2011): 885–904.
For a valuable example, see Austin Jersild, “The Soviet State as Imperial Scavenger: ‘Catch Up
and Surpass’ in the Transnational Socialist Bloc, 1950–1960,” American Historical Review 116,
1 (2011): 109–32.
6
“The city–region–nation framework,” argues Gyan Prakash, “does violence to the history
of modern cities,” and he accordingly advocates for increased attention to global engagements
but also “ ‘thick’ local imaginaries.” See his “Introduction,” in The Spaces of the Modern City:
Imaginaries, Politics, and Everyday Life, ed. Prakash and Kevin Kruse (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2008), 9.
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Thaw. Castillo’s analysis, taken up in the middle section, sheds light on the
transnational entanglements of a Cold War battle over consumption and
design supremacy. My third section examines an architectural episode in
Moscow in 1958 to argue for both the relevance and the specificity of the
“Eastern bloc arena” in these international postwar currents.
The context is Khrushchev’s Thaw, the decade or so after Stalin’s death,
which has produced everything from detailed studies on Khrushchev’s
personality to analyses of the post-Stalin succession struggle, the release of Gulag
prisoners, the tumultuous year 1956, and on to studies of de-Stalinization,
state designs, and domesticity.7 From the onset, the Thaw became associated
with the cultural realm. Yet in contrast to foreign policy, culture, in Nancy
Condee’s words, “could tolerate no peaceful coexistence.”8 She concludes that
the Thaw was “not about the lessening of conflict” but rather “about the
rhetoric of conflict: its rules, tropes, and gestures.”9 One might add that the
Thaw was also about the realization—on the part of individuals like Konrád’s
city builder—of living in a system that had programmed its own planners.
Beyond these domestic developments, the Thaw was also about an intense
systemic competition. The postwar years introduced a series of new challenges,
including reconstruction, decolonization, and the “friendship of the peoples,”
all of which tested interwar definitions of internationalism. When coupled
with the postwar boom of capitalist economies, the acquired Soviet sphere
of influence in Europe could also turn into a liability, since socialist states
explicitly presented themselves as superior to their Western counterparts.
7
Accounts of the Soviet Thaw include C. L. Sulzberger, The Big Thaw (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1956); Giuseppe Boffa, Inside the Khrushchev Era (New York: Marzani and
Munsell, 1959); Liudmila Alexeyeva, The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin
Era (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993); Elena Zubkova, Russia after the War:
Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 151–204; William
Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003); and Polly Jones,
ed., The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev
Era (London: Routledge, 2006). On the succession struggle, see, among others, Mark Kramer,
“The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal–
External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making (Part 1),” Journal of Cold War Studies 1, 1 (1999):
3–55. On Gulag returnees, see Amir Weiner, “The Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East
European Rebellions, and Soviet Frontier Politics,” Journal of Modern History 78, 2 (2006):
333–76; and Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the
Fate of Reform after Stalin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). On postwar material
culture in the Soviet Union and in the Eastern bloc, see Susan E. Reid and David Crowley,
eds., Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe (Oxford:
Berg, 2000).
8
Nancy Condee, “Cultural Codes of the Thaw,” in Nikita Khrushchev, ed. William Taubman,
Sergei Khrushchev, and Abbott Gleason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 160–76,
quotation on 164.
9
Ibid., 169.
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Just as maturing awareness of the Soviet (or Stalinist) past under Khrushchev
could seem to reinvigorate the system, therefore, so anxious attempts to
catch and overtake the West could seem to depress it. This constitutes part
of the story. But beyond Soviet–West exchanges, it is important not to ignore
the Eastern bloc level of analysis. Stalin’s death was followed by efforts to
revive the socialist integration project, resulting in more sustained exchange,
planning coordination, and often more conflict among socialist countries
themselves. As arenas where transnational actors, state authorities, planners,
and users all converged, material culture and the built environment are
particularly suitable for examining these overlapping dilemmas of the Thaw.
Neighborhood
Stephen Bittner analyzes the Thaw not at the level of society at large but
through the daily lived experience in a single neighborhood, Moscow’s
Arbat, and through the lens of various cultural actors: musicians and
trainees; theater directors and guardians of repertoire; architects, planners,
and preservation experts. This allows the author to weave characters and
stories into a readable narrative. But the focus on agents of culture has more
wide-ranging implications. The lives of these individuals permit Bittner to
capture the contradictions contained in the metaphor of ottepel´, Thaw.
Bittner asserts that in a world gushing with other strong metaphors, the
Thaw was a flawed one. He calls attention not to a period of springtime after
Stalinism, but to “impermanence, instability, and uncertainty” (3). Within
the cultural realm, seemingly trivial clashes in interpretation quickly escalated
into real-life drama. Bittner’s achievement is to capture these individual and
professional lives riddled with ambition and contradiction but also with
increasing awareness of their own past. Implicitly, the choice of focusing on
agents of culture also recognizes that no matter how vast expectations of deStalinization may have been in other areas, the Thaw was chiefly a matter of
the cultural sphere. For these intellectual types “Thaw” was real, even though
it also remained permanently tied to fiction (via Ilya Ehrenburg).
Bittner’s Arbat, then, is almost exclusively inhabited by intellectuals and
their ghosts. Having become synonymous with childhood in the works of
authors like Bulat Okudzhava and Anatolii Rybakov, the Arbat seemed to
preserve the aura of an old, pre-concrete Moscow. In fact, the neighborhood
underwent routine demolitions and reconfigurations, as airy apartments once
owned by aristocrats turned into densely populated communal apartments.
The neighborhood became, as Bittner puts it, “a casualty of Soviet power”
(36). For many who lived in the Arbat, Stalinism was disruptive, destructive,
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invalidating. But as urban destruction and spatial reconfigurations created
new spaces and realities, so the Stalin era produced new relations and modes
of thinking (along with institutions and nodes of interest). De-Stalinization,
which Bittner describes as “neither systemic in scope, nor coherent in
implementation,” often dramatically revealed the creative (if sinister)
dimensions of Stalinism. Indeed, had Stalinism not entailed a way of being
in the world, seemingly minor challenges would hardly have escalated into
loud public storms in the 1950s. Although he does not explicitly state this,
Bittner’s work suggests that it makes more sense to study processes of the
Thaw as signs of maturing Soviet awareness and identification with the past,
punctuated by attendant anxieties vis-à-vis the Western lifestyle, rather than
more examples of alleged resistance or challenges to “the state” or the “Soviet
system.”
Take, for instance, Arbat’s Gnesin Music-Pedagogy Institute, where
teachers observed an alarming rise of student interest in Western composers
(George Gershwin, Igor Stravinsky, Paul Hindemith). While the teachers
favored more “openness” in repertoire, they nevertheless enforced norms that
limited exposure to Western composers. Why was this the case? In part, as
Bittner shows, this was a result of the incoherence and contradictory nature
of the Thaw, which denounced Stalin but did not actually replace Stalin’s
cultural decrees. Some teachers associated threats to the curriculum with
disciplinary problems among students. The most rebellious youths, in turn,
interpreted stringent academic controls as Stalinist. But although the Thaw
brought to surface these generational conflicts, it did not fundamentally alter
the essential mechanisms of power. It merely laid some of them bare, which
is to say that it exposed virtually everyone as actively involved in battling
over the borders of socialist culture. Bittner captures precisely this tension
between the awareness of a distinct Soviet cultural mission (embodied in the
school curriculum) and a pervasive anxiety about Western culture. Teachers
at the Gnesin, he notes, “did not have to be Stalinists to be saddened by
some aspects of the thaw” (74). Like the neighborhood, which became a
metaphor for the collective memory of many of its illustrious and often illfated inhabitants, the school curriculum was about something more than
pedagogy. It was part of the civilizational mission of Stalinism, and one did
not have to be a Stalinist, even after Khrushchev’s assault in February 1956,
to be devoted to it.
The Thaw itself, Bittner argues in the second half of the book, later
became an object of nostalgia. Suddenly, an era of openness by decree, marked
by a man who was held in esteem neither by the populace nor by creative
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types—“a meddler par excellence”—became remembered as having offered a
missed opportunity (6). The idea of the Thaw as a “liberal period” emerged
in contrast to a post-Thaw era of stagnation and renewed restrictions. Bittner
rejects this linear trajectory along an axis of progress and regress. The break
between the Stalin and Khrushchev years, he argues, was far from coherent
or abrupt. Still, in light of Bittner’s analysis, a number of other questions
emerge: Could it be, perhaps, that sudden fits of openness actually reinforced
party rule? Could it be that destabilization in the cultural sphere proved
productive insofar as it enabled power struggles among apparatchiks, officials,
and other elites? These struggles benefited the communist establishment,
which discovered that it was not necessary to enforce strict cultural continuity
to ensure party continuity.
So what exactly changed during the Thaw? Factories were renamed,
statues were dismantled, and the Lenin cult quietly replaced the Stalin cult.10
To assess the significance of the Thaw, Bittner fast-forwards to the 1960s,
when the Arbat hosted the infamous trial of the writers Andrei Siniavskii and
Iulii Daniel´ at the Institute of World Literature. This trial constituted, he
argues, the very public beginning of a retraction of the autonomy “on loan”
to the cultural elite in the 1960s (178). Bittner insists that in the course of a
decade enough had changed among the intelligentsia to foster a more resilient
challenge to arbitrary political controls. By the mid-1960s, however, the
debate had essentially shrunk to the issue of leaving the autonomy of cultural
institutions in place or taking it back altogether. As further evidence of the
intelligentsia’s opposition to the establishment, Bittner points to numerous
letters written in support of Siniavskii and Daniel´, some of which employed
a new dichotomy between “Thaw” and “freeze.” But as Bittner admits,
not everyone wrote in support of the authors on trial; some apparently
admonished them. Bittner argues that the letters written in support of the
two authors reflected the emergence of a new “civic duty.” It would have
made sense, however, also to analyze the letters that were critical of Siniavskii
and Daniel´, if only as a reflection, perhaps, of a different kind of duty. Still,
one does not have to share Bittner’s assessment of the overall importance of
these letter-writing campaigns or the distinction between a “civic duty” and
alternative kinds of duties (ideological, professional, communist, Soviet) to
appreciate the argument for a collective engagement with the narrative of the
Thaw.
10

For a compelling overview of the urban effects of de-Stalinization on Moscow, see Timothy
J. Colton, Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1995),
358–81.
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That engagement took many forms. Like October, the Thaw was also
eventually told, whether in writing or speech.11 These narratives employed a
distinct chronology (as evidenced by the urban reshaping of the Arbat) but
they also inevitably referred to an official Soviet chronology. Bittner traces
this engagement in two other examples drawn from the architectural and
planning professions. First, he argues that emerging activists increasingly
pushed state actors to preserve historic urban sites. Within the complicated
framework of the Soviet Union, these kinds of pressures could give rise
to multiple conflicts both at the level of a republic and at the level of the
union. In Bittner’s account, Moscow-based preservationists, architects, and
planners (but also the construction industry itself ) increasingly waged a
battle in the mid-1960s over what elements of the built environment were
worthy of preservation. As other scholars have pointed out, conflicts between
preservationists and state bureaucrats were signs of maturing professional
awareness but also intense competition for resources.12 But these battles also
crucially revealed the tension and mutually constitutive dimensions of Soviet
and local identities, since experts often employed local examples to make the
case for a Soviet heritage.
The other example is what Bittner calls “the rehabilitation of the avantgarde.” Debates among experts and bureaucrats about industrial building
methods and preservation took place in a climate of growing interest in the
Constructivist architecture of the 1920s and its role in the history of the Soviet
Union more broadly. Planners could now speak openly about this flourishing
architectural period and the visionary names associated with it: Konstantin
Mel´nikov, Ivan Leonidov, Moisei Ginzburg, and others. In the context of the
Thaw, the avant-garde took on a new meaning, revealing not only awareness
of the Soviet past but also its cultural standing vis-à-vis the capitalist West.
Still, this was no full-fledged return to Constructivism. Brilliant as it is in
conjuring up a particular political process under party-state rule, the term
“rehabilitation” should not be taken literally. Fundamentally, the avantgarde was never officially reconfirmed as a viable model. Exhumed, yes, but
not fully rehabilitated. Indeed, it is a legacy that remains threatened to this
day. The association between Constructivism and later Soviet architecture
remained tenuous, the return incomplete. Khrushchev, after all, as Condee

11

See Frederick Corney, Telling October: Memory and the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
12
See John P. Farrell, “If These Stones Could Only Speak: Historical and Cultural Preservation
in a Soviet Context, 1955–1966” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Davis, 2004).

642

ELIDOR MËHILLI

Death of a Modernist Icon: Moisei Ginzburg (with I. Milinis),
Narkomfin Communal House, 1928–30, Moscow, southern view
Source: Author’s photograph, 2009.

A Modernist Icon under Restoration: Konstantin Mel´nikov,
Rusakov Workers Club, 1927–28, Moscow, street view
Source: Author’s photograph, 2009.
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has remarked, was a “cultural critic” who harbored a noticeable “antipathy
towards modernism.”13
Both examples are revealing precisely because of the tension between
ideology and the long-standing ambitions of socialist planners, on the one
hand, and collective identification with the Soviet past and an increasing
push by Soviet authorities toward competition with the capitalist world, on
the other. They also demonstrate that the Soviet built environment presents
us with a somewhat special case in the social and cultural spheres, insofar as
authorities allowed the (partial) resurrection of certain pre-Stalinist forms.14
Constructivism became a vehicle to identify a valuable Soviet legacy in
architecture. It also seemed to satisfy two criteria of the Thaw: a rejection
of Stalinism, as an evil personified in one figure, and an embrace of Soviet
ambitions vis-à-vis the West (where specialists increasingly recognized the
influence of Soviet Constructivism).15 It may be tempting to read preservation
efforts as a form of challenge toward the Soviet state. Yet, as many valuable
accounts of urban preservation in Western Europe and the United States
have established, preservation actors are guided by specific interests, beliefs,
and a distinct logic about history and the past.16 Rather than strictly a field
of opposition or even resistance to the establishment, preservation could
be effectively co-opted by the party-state.17 In addition to such topics as
tourism and consumer culture in the Eastern bloc, this is a promising avenue
of research that can potentially tell us a great deal not merely about the
dilemmas of de-Stalinization and the life cycles of reform but also, crucially,
about the production of a history of socialism itself, the developing awareness
of a recent socialist past, and the ways in which that awareness was connected
to material life.18
13

Condee, “Cultural Codes of the Thaw,” 171.
On this point, see Michael David-Fox, “Cultural Memory in the Century of Upheaval: Big
Pictures and Snapshots,” Kritika 2, 3 (2001): 601–13.
15
Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, Architettura contemporanea (Milan: Electa,
1976). See also Patrizia Bonifazio et al., “Introduzione,” in Tra guerra e pace: Società, cultura
e architettura nel secondo dopoguerra, ed. Bonifazio et al. (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1998), 9–33.
16
M. Christine Boyer, The City of Collective Memory: Its Historical Imagery and Architectural
Entertainments (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). Boyer argues that Western urban design
and preservation efforts in the 1970s and 1980s often borrowed from 19th-century fabrications
to nostalgically “recreate” the past from fragmented urban remnants.
17
In socialist Albania, for example, Soviet-trained architect Gani Strazimiri helped launch
a pioneering campaign to preserve “museum cities” in the early 1960s. Nevertheless, state
authorities intentionally left religious architecture to deteriorate.
18
See Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker, eds., Turizm: The Russian and East European
Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). For
examples beyond the Eastern bloc, see D. Medina Lasansky and Brian McLaren, eds.,
Architecture and Tourism: Perception, Performance, and Place (Oxford: Berg, 2004).
14
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City
Tensions produced by the Thaw were made evident at Novyi Arbat, the
ambitious Khrushchev-era urban planning project that transformed the old
neighborhood into a modern showpiece. You go for a stroll along the busy
thoroughfare, past Moskovskii dom knigi, amid the cacophony of stores
blasting pop music, the sandwiched snack bars, and the cafés nestled within
the winding gallery on the southern side, and you can’t help but find the
sheer scale of this urban ensemble daunting—even in a city like Moscow. To
make room for the nine mammoth glass and concrete skyscrapers erected in
the 1960s, entire buildings in the neighborhood had to be razed, alleyways
blotted out, throngs of inhabitants relocated. Ultimately, four towers rose
on a two-story gallery running the whole corridor while five other structures
were set freestanding on the northern side. What started out as a relatively
simple street project in the late 1950s ballooned into a sprawling enterprise
within a matter of years. Novyi Arbat became something of a symbol of an
era, a clear departure from the architectural and planning models of the Stalin
period. But it also came to embody a modernizing ethos heightened by the
postwar West European boom.19
In December 1954, Khrushchev, whom Bittner calls “a kind of architect
manqué” (109), famously railed against Stalin-era architecture at the All-Union
Convention of Construction Workers.20 Though hardly secret, the speech had
for architects and planners the kind of seismic impact that the February 1956
speech at the 20th Party Congress would have for communists across the world.
Khrushchev criticized Moscow’s ornate skyscrapers and took the construction
industry to task for having long invoked the tenets of Socialist Realism to
justify extravagant designs and financial folly. Alternating between sarcasm
and reprimand, he warned against superfluities in construction (but also a
reversion to Constructivism) while urging simplicity in design and a rapid
expansion of industrial building methods.21 There was plenty of irony in the
fact that the supposed turn from aesthetic authoritarianism came in the form,
19

Amir Weiner has argued that the renunciation of terror under Khrushchev came with a
“renewed investment of power and trust in the population” but also a lingering “utopian drive”
from the Stalin era. See his “Robust Revolution to Retiring Revolution: The Life Cycle of the
Soviet Revolution, 1945–1968,” Slavonic and East European Review 86, 2 (2008): 208–31.
20
Khrushchev’s speech was excerpted in an early pioneering volume on international
postwar architecture. See “Remove Shortcomings in Design, Improve Work of Architects,”
in Architecture Culture, 1943–1968, ed. Joan Ockman (New York: Rizzoli, 1993), 184–89.
21
There was more than a hint of political calculation to Khrushchev’s intervention, especially
as the attack came during the final stages of the post-Stalin succession struggle. See Vladislav
Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 94–101.
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essentially, of a scathingly delivered order. With the ornate gigantomania of
the Stalin era angrily dismissed, a new concrete gigantomania started to take
shape.22 But how did this come about exactly? How was it that Khrushchev’s
“economy of construction” and the motto “faster, better, cheaper” came to
take precedence from Germany and the Balkans all the way to Siberia? While
unquestionably important, Khrushchev’s personality cannot explain how a
single speech could have such a far-reaching impact on the built environment
across the socialist world. Distinct mechanisms comprising the socialist world
system enabled exchanges of ideas and techniques, but there was also a more
broadly international dimension to this turn.
At the American National Exhibition in Moscow in the summer of 1959,
Soviet visitors witnessed not the might of the American military machine but
the intoxicating power of consumer goods, modern household appliances,
and brightly appointed model homes.23 When Nixon took Khrushchev on
a tour around the exhibition, the two gravitated towards the Splitnik, an
American prefabricated suburban model home, where the U.S. vice-president
famously invited the Soviet premier to take a look around the kitchen.
Pictures of the two leaders gesturing toward a yellow General Electric washerdryer made the rounds across the world, but as Greg Castillo argues in Cold
War on the Home Front, the famous Kitchen Debate was the culmination,
rather than the starting point, of a long-standing competition in material
culture. Castillo systematically traces the “psychological warfare” designed
and executed by U.S.-based information agencies, cultural institutions, and
ambitious impresarios. By focusing on household exhibitions mounted in
West Germany, as well as Soviet responses and mirroring efforts to design
a socialist material culture in the Eastern bloc, Castillo adds considerable
evidence to the now more widely accepted claim that the Cold War was not
fought merely in military terms but also, crucially, in the realm of design,
consumerism, and domesticity. The American home, he asserts, with its
dazzling electric appliances and consumer comforts, turned into a veritable
Cold War weapon. American propaganda campaigns throughout the
1950s “encouraged the Soviet bloc to measure its progress through direct
22

On Soviet “gigantomania” as a product of “the fascination and commitment to a technology
of display,” as well as the propensity of socialist systems for “an exaggerated interest in mass
production owing both to egalitarian ideological precepts and resource scarcities,” see Paul
Josephson, “ ‘Projects of the Century’ in Soviet History: Large-Scale Technologies from Lenin
to Gorbachev,” Technology and Culture 36, 3 (1995): 519–59.
23
On the impact of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, see Susan E. Reid, “Who
Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition in Moscow,
1959,” Kritika 9, 4 (2008): 855–904; and Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s
Advance through 20th-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2005), 453–57.

646

ELIDOR MËHILLI

comparisons with Western per-capita private consumption, the Achilles heel
of economies based on state-owned heavy industries” (xi).
Through the mechanisms of the Marshall Plan, U.S. authorities waged a
propaganda war by promoting mass consumption and visions of abundance.
While this effort initially lacked any aesthetic prescriptions, Castillo exposes
the curious institutional links that ultimately led to the embrace of the
International Style by U.S. campaigns in West Germany. (Chief among these
institutions was the Museum of Modern Art in New York.) This curious
convergence was exemplified by the 1952 exhibition “We’re Building a Better
Life,” prepared by the Mutual Security Agency, a successor to the Marshall
Plan. It included a model home that visitors could walk through as well as an
“inhabited” life-size apartment unit complete with a narrator perched above,
who described the wonders of modern household technology. The U.S.
campaign, Castillo observes, hinged on the idea of cultivating “a transnational
middle class” as well as on the promotion of Atlanticism, the “economic
and military alignment that required West German rearmament” (69–70).
Needless to say, though not directly targeting East Germans, the exhibition
had a dizzying effect on workers living in a workers’ state but lacking similar
material comforts. And even though not all West Germans were persuaded by
the ideas of domesticity inherent to the American consumption formula, the
images nevertheless proved highly seductive.
This battle was not limited to the realm of choreographed exhibitions and
idealized homes. Castillo also investigates the tangled history of pedagogical
institutes like Ulm’s Hochschule für Gestaltung (HfG), a kind of postwar
Bauhaus financed by the State Department that eventually came to embody
“soft-power renegotiation” (42). Inaugurated in 1953 and championed,
among others, by Bauhaus alumnus Max Bill, the HfG came to infuse prewar
functionalism with postwar consumerism. There were similar efforts in
East Germany: Mart Stam, another former Bauhaus instructor, attempted
in the late 1940s to recast Bauhaus pedagogy and cultivate a proletarian
intelligentsia by emphasizing industrial design.24 But where West German
experiments flourished, efforts to build a laboratory for creating an industrial
socialist material culture in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) ended
in failure. In the early 1950s, East German authorities launched an aggressive
campaign against modernism (46–49). This new course was marked by
the establishment of the Deutsche Bauakademie, modeled after the Soviet
24

On the contradictory fortunes of the Bauhaus legacy in East Germany, see also Eli Rubin,
“The Form of Socialism without Ornament: Consumption, Ideology, and the Fall and Rise
of Modernist Design in the German Democratic Republic,” Journal of Design History 19, 2
(2006): 155–68.
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Academy of Architecture and headed by Kurt Liebknecht (nephew of the
martyred Spartacus founder Karl Liebknecht). Since the Bauakademie was
interlinked with the SED Central Committee, design became enforced
through the party machinery (50–51). The Stalinallee, East Germany’s grand
socialist urban showpiece and predecessor to the Novyi Arbat, “evoked a wider
world spreading outward from the boulevard in a single direction—east” (90).
Conscious of the limits of focusing much of his book on utopian
exhibitions and model homes displayed at trade fairs, Castillo is careful to
point out that “both sides” presented selective visions of domesticity and
technology. The average American home on display at Sokol´niki Park in
1959, he notes, was improbable (154). But precisely as exaggerations, these
urban displays are highly suggestive. “At the first opportunity,” one Soviet
visitor to the U.S. exhibition observed, “I would buy such a house.” Still,
one could desire the displayed modern home and profess a belief in the
superiority of socialism. As another visitor reportedly stated, “If the exhibition
represents the American way of life, then it is the American way of life that
we should overtake” (158). Others still, Castillo tells us, were dumbfounded
by the presence of multiple rooms in a single apartment.25 But why did the
Soviets allow these unabashed displays of American consumerism in the first
place? Castillo points to expectations and promises that the Soviets created
themselves, especially the massive turn toward industrial building methods in
the 1950s, galvanized by the party promise in 1957 that every Soviet family
would receive its own apartment.
When it came to industrial building methods, Soviet planners had long
looked toward the United States.26 But Castillo shows how U.S. propagandists
shipped prefab suburban homes to the Soviet Union to showcase both an
American Way of Life and the breakdown of rigid class structures in the
United States, where, as one advertisement put it, “everybody became a
capitalist” (125). Another tactic was to “convert” Soviet functionaries by
inviting them on tours of the construction industry in the United States.
During one such visit by Soviet housing specialists in 1955, one of the
American hosts observed that at the construction site “the Reds swarmed
over the slab, dodging partitions and roofing sections as they came off the
truck, reaching up to gauge the ceiling heights (which they considered low),
25

For a discussion of the comment books of the 1959 U.S. exhibition, see Aleksei Fominykh,
“ ‘Kartinki s vystavki’: Knigi otzyvov Amerikanskoi vystavki v Moskve 1959 goda—
vozvrashchenie istochnika,” Ab Imperio, no. 2 (2010): 151–70. Excerpts were published as
“Amerikanskaia natsional´naia vystavka v Moskve, 1959 god: Kniga otzyvov,” Ab Imperio, no.
2 (2010): 187–216.
26
Richard Anderson, “USA/USSR: Architecture and War,” Grey Room, no. 34 (Winter 2009):
80–103.
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examining heating, plumbing, and wire connections” (131). Reports indicate
that the Soviets were eager to buy U.S. prefab homes “complete with heating
and air conditioning equipment, GE electric kitchen, and all display model
furnishings.” The Soviet minister of construction, similarly, was “ravished by
an American suburban home” (134). Though he does not employ Russian
sources, Castillo intelligently combs through U.S. correspondence to argue
that Soviet planning authorities were intensely driven by the desire to replicate
U.S. technology advances, which begins to explain why U.S. exhibitions were
allowed in the Soviet Union in the first place.
The move toward the promised single-family apartment also signaled
a new development: Soviet mass consumption. “Moving to a newly built
separate apartment and creating a new domestic life,” Steven Harris has
observed, “were the mass phenomena through which most Soviet citizens
experienced the ‘thaw.’ ” In less than two decades, some 38 million Soviet
families made that move.27 But if centrally planned economies were adept
at churning out basic mass-produced apartments, they lagged far behind
in crafting an interior material culture and the technology of everyday life
(what East Germans referred to as Umweltgestaltung.) Crucial to this effort,
Castillo observes, was the attempt to define an “alternate model of consumer
citizenship” (166). Yet these attempts merely “affirmed the instability of East
bloc socialism as a historical formation” (174). Castillo concludes: “What
was shared in Western and Eastern Europe was not lifestyle but lifestyle
aspirations” (177). Soviet planning may have suffered from a plethora of
structural problems, but envy was as crucial as any other. Some authors have
pointed to the expansion of single-family apartments as a kind of retreat of
the Soviet state from the private sphere.28 If anything, however, it seems to
have highlighted conflict and brought even more sharply into focus the allconsuming presence of the state, given pervasive consumer shortages. As in
the prewar period, space continued to be counted, tabulated, and rationed,
including vertical space. As experts and neighborhood activists waged a battle
27

Soviet mass housing, writes Steven Harris, “was a quintessentially Soviet campaign: a
systemic solution to a systemic problem” (“ ‘I Know All the Secrets of My Neighbors’: The
Quest for Privacy in the Era of the Separate Apartment,” in Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres
of Soviet Russia, ed. Lewis H. Siegelbaum [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006], 171–90,
quotations on 171 and 185).
28
Mark B. Smith, “Khrushchev’s Promise to Eliminate the Urban Housing Shortage: Rights,
Rationality, and the Communist Future,” in Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev,
ed. Melanie Ilić and Jeremy Smith (New York: Routledge, 2009), 26–45; Smith, Property of
Communists: The Urban Housing Program from Stalin to Khrushchev (DeKalb: Northern Illinois
University Press, 2010).
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for the Soviet past in Moscow, other battles with the capitalist West took
place inside city exhibition halls, kitchens, and living rooms.29
Castillo’s greatest contribution is to direct us toward the making of
aspirations, the ways in which those aspirations were shaped by a dynamic
interaction, without which any understanding of technology during the
Cold War would be inherently limited. The Eastern bloc, he notes, often
served as a “cultural conveyer belt” to introduce Western innovations for
testing in Moscow (189). This had important repercussions in the Soviet
Union, but it also became evident in the East German campaign to “catch
and overtake” the other Germany, an effort that raised both consumer
expectations and the awareness of the centrally planned economy’s
shortcomings (191). The relational aspect of international consumption had
unexpected and frustrating consequences for socialist states. “Torn between
promises of plenty and rationalizations for scarcity,” Castillo writes, “the
project to cultivate an enlightened socialist consumer instead became a
finishing school for citizen alienation” (204).
To be sure, the industrial building systems championed by socialist states
have a long, varied, and truly transnational history. Inherent to this modern
preoccupation was the obsession with the automobile and the prospect of
factory-made houses in an era of Taylorized mass production of consumer
goods.30 When it came to housing, this obsession gave rise, in the words of
Hans Scharoun, to “a genuine transformation of a kind that humanity rarely
encounters.”31 If there is a dimension of the history of the built environment
that truly captures the social convulsions, revolutionary imaginations, and
the transnational flow of ideas and techniques in the 20th century, this is the
29

Susan E. Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer
Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev,” Slavic Review 61, 2 (2002): 212–52; Victor
Buchli, “Khrushchev, Modernism, and the Fight against Petit-bourgeois Consciousness in the
Soviet Home,” in The Material Culture Reader, ed. Victor Buchli (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 215–
36; Mart Kalm and Ingrid Ruudi, eds., Constructed Happiness: The Domestic Environment in the
Cold War Era (Tallinn: Estonian Academy of Arts, 2005); Ruth Oldenziel and Karin Zachmann,
eds., Cold War Kitchen: Americanization, Technology, and European Users (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2009).
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Barry Bergdoll pertinently distinguishes between early practices of prefabricating building
parts offsite, which were common, with what he calls an “architectural culture of prefabrication,”
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Henschelverlag, 1957), xix.
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story of industrial building systems. Attending these experiments, invariably,
were pressing questions of variation and uniformity, the tension between
architect and machine, market booms and busts, as well as issues related to
site conditions, climates, and social context. The other crucial factor in the
expansion of industrial methods was war.32 As Jean-Louis Cohen reminds us,
World War II extended military concrete building techniques into postwar civil
construction programs (in France as in the Eastern bloc).33 A history of these
systems would encompass, among other examples, the 19th-century treatises
of the French inventor and industrialist François Coignet; experiments picked
up in Britain by Joseph Tall and in the United States by Thomas Edison; the
highly influential designs of European architects at the 1927 Weissenhof
exhibition in Stuttgart (Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius, Le Corbusier)
but also Martin Wagner and Ernst May; Henry-Russell Hitchcock’s and
Philip Johnson’s 1932 The International Style; the entire history of the Congrès
Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM); the French innovator Jean
Prouvé and the architect and planner Marcel Lods; R. Buckminster Fuller and
Richard Neutra in the United States (via Vienna); the prefabricated Lustron
houses in the 1940s United States; the large-panel system of the French
company Raymond Camus (exported to the Soviet bloc); and the Danish
Larsen-Nielsen system, applied en masse in European public housing projects
in the 1960s.34
32
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In Western Europe, architects intensely debated Typisierung at the
beginning of the 20th century.35 As prolific designers and innovators were
dislocated by Hitler’s rise to power—some attempted to execute their ideas
in the United States; others traveled to the Soviet Union—divergent paths
emerged across borders and economies. Because these paths often mirrored
one another, and since they necessarily originated in common aspirations of
modernity, they may appear to be the same thing. At every turn, however, they
were shaped by markets (or lack thereof ), government patrons, companies,
business interests, and planning institutions.36 Bittner carefully traces the
intense discussions among Soviet planners over tipovoe proektirovanie (serial
reproduction of building prototypes) and tipizatsiia (standardization of
distinct elements). Although the move from one to the other was neither
consistent nor linear, a shift nevertheless took place under socialism from
large-bloc building systems to the large-panel system (using prefabricated
slabs, as opposed to bulky blocks, for load-bearing walls and even sections
like staircases or balconies).37 Inevitably, socialist planners looked toward the
West.38 Castillo’s account elucidates the international dimensions of this turn
and the ways in which aspirations to “catch and overtake” the West led to the
evolution of the ubiquitous housing prototypes in the GDR and what Blair
Ruble has aptly called “hyper-standardization” across the socialist world.39
But there were also important channels established within the Eastern bloc

35
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whereby techniques and expertise circulated.40 It becomes useful, then,
to think not so much in terms of a simple line from Gropius and Stuttgart to
postwar socialist tipizatsiia but rather about interconnected ideas and angles
of innovation executed in various contexts and at different scales. These
combinations produced outcomes of varying focus, detail, and impact.41
Consider, also, the obsession with the promise of new materials and the
way this obsession has shaped modern cities. Much like modernist architects
in the interwar period, socialist building industries celebrated the powers
and promise of zhelezobeton (reinforced concrete).42 Across the Eastern bloc,
construction industry experts exchanged technical details and formulas
through coordinated efforts. Yet here, too, it would be too simplistic to
draw a straight line between modernist euphoria and postwar Soviet-style
mass planning. After all, the history of this enduring material is far from
straightforward. Rather, it has been characterized by leaps and bounds,
waves of entrepreneurial investment and capitulation, periods of almost utter
disillusionment and sudden fits of enthusiasm and productivity.43 It was not
so much that the obsession with concrete’s powers was narrowly ideological.
Rather, over time, the material came to encompass the beliefs of a modern
era. It was “ideally suited to modernism’s aspiration to structural ‘honesty’ ”
insofar as it allowed designers to expose load-bearing functions that had been
previously concealed.44 But just as the material made it possible to expose the
inner structure of buildings and to execute architectural visions of a greater

40
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scale, so it also permanently fixed in space contemporary technological
deficiencies (like poor material quality and imperfect fixtures).
Beton. For millions, the word alone conjures up countless intimate details
of drab everyday life in the Eastern bloc. Yet, for a long while, concrete also
became associated with ideas of progress, social reform, and unprecedented
possibilities. Its story conjures up visions of modernity, often in competition,
and the ways in which “a seemingly innocuous and ingenious combination of
inert substances” could be imbued with distinct meanings.45 It also provides an
excellent case study to locate the East–West conjuncture. Under socialism, it
was possible to embrace distinct features of this inherently modern obsession
and couple them with designs for a noncapitalist modernity. Modern mass
prefabrication under centrally planned economies, in turn, gave rise to
problems that had not existed before. In the absence of markets, innovation
lagged and plagiarism of technological models spiked. State monopoly over
property and planning (despite varying degrees of decentralization in the
construction industry) shaped avenues for research and design. Prefabricated
“houses for delivery” in the United States were fundamentally tied to a series
of companies competing for a supposedly emerging market, which ultimately
did not materialize. In West European cities, prefabrication often became
associated with disastrous social planning and troubled satellite towns.
These examples were intimately tied to the opportunities and pressures of
markets, patent rules, and entrepreneurial initiatives. Not so in planned
economies. Unencumbered by markets or social backlash, socialist states
executed industrial building methods on an unprecedented scale. Scale, in
turn, introduced problems that were not merely quantitative in nature: onsite
assembly; organization of labor; workforce training; site inspections; mass
social and leisure provisions; massive environmental consequences.46
These endless rows of prefab blocks shaped (and still do) the urban
experience of tens of millions.47 By the early 1960s, the United Nations
had recognized the Soviet Union as a world leader in building cheap
mass housing, so it organized study tours in the Soviet republics for Latin
45
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American, African, Asian, and Middle Eastern planners.48 In the GDR, die
Platte became a reference to life under socialism itself.49 Studying this vast
material legacy of socialism raises a series of issues. First, the common art
historical emphasis on identifiable networks of artistic patronage may become
irrelevant, since many of these vast complexes were designed collectively or
anonymously. Especially in the less developed socialist countries, planners
often borrowed or copied foreign technical systems. These housing systems,
moreover, came with a corresponding planning and distribution bureaucracy
as well as a new vocabulary.50 While the exact processes and models varied
somewhat from country to country, on the whole certain elemental features of
socialist material reality became sufficiently similar across the Eastern bloc to
allow for essentially shared references to emerge. They are still visible today in
the expanding industry of resurrecting socialist material culture in Germany
and elsewhere.51 To a certain extent, these features of central planning
mirrored the decline of the heroic architect in the West as well as the rise of
objects of everyday life, which in the postwar period “involved more radical
transformations of space than the most extreme architectural proposals.”52
But the socialist construction industry also provides a valuable case study of
the way in which diffuse power operates: by making seemingly abstract terms
(“housing need,” “cost reduction,” “simple design”) operational, by blurring
authorial claims, and by shifting accountability for built outcomes.
Cold War divisions also produced unexpected entanglements. One
example is Oscar Niemeyer, the distinguished author of Brasilia’s urban
plan, who maintained close ties to the GDR and was a popular fixture in
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Everyday Socialism on Display: Storefront replica of a socialist-era interior
advertising Ostel, a GDR-themed hostel, Berlin, Germany
Source: Author’s photograph, 2009.
the socialist architectural press.53 Indeed, modern Brazilian architecture was
exhibited and discussed widely in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1960s.54
Still, exchanges and international connections of this kind could have the
effect of actually reinforcing East–West divisions. That socialist planning
was not isolated from broader international developments does not mean
that it was indistinguishable from them. Socialism was more than the sum
of standardization in technology and ideological and aesthetic formulas. The
coupling of widely available technology with specific planning visions and
organizational systems (as well as inherent systemic shortages) created a kind
of familiar amalgam on a grand scale. That is why it was possible to have
an international socialist “market” for standard building systems without an
actual market. Planning bureaucracies enabled an unprecedented exchange in
technology and expertise across the Eastern bloc. Belief in building socialism
was not relevant merely because it provided a clear blueprint for aesthetic
or technical choices (most often it did not), but because it framed ambition
53
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and established the parameters of the possible. Assessing the international
dimensions of the socialist planning experiment, therefore, should not be an
end in itself. Rather, an appreciation for the porosity of cultural and technical
frontiers, the ambiguity inherent in dealings with one’s past, international
aspirations, and the back-and-forth of specific practices and ideas ought to
bring more into the focus the specific ways that socialist states could be both
“monolithic and brittle.”55 Rather than staying confined to familiar questions
about the limits of Soviet power, this approach would raise new questions, for
example, about the role of comparison in historical development, the process
of mimicking, and everyday practices inherent to an imperfect socialist
material life.
When reading Bittner and Castillo together, it becomes clear that
anxieties over the Stalinist past and the postwar consumerist boom in the
West converged in the minds of socialist apparatchiks. As Konrád’s city
builder would have it, the socialist system was both programmed in a specific
way and programmed those who lived within it, including their desires.
The Thaw seemed to heighten awareness of this programming by displaying
parts of the inner architecture of the socialist planning machinery (just as
reinforced concrete exposed both the ambitions and inherent limitations of
the socialist urban program). That was the “socialist design”—not a specific
aesthetic formula or a consistent definition but rather an institutionalized
logic, a series of practices and models that were often invented, routinely
borrowed from the West, executed on a massive scale, then submitted to the
grueling test of standing up to Western achievements.
Empire
An imposing silhouette frames the entrance to the Novyi Arbat thoroughfare in
Moscow: a concrete and steel high-rise building resembling an open book. As
the headquarters of the Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance,
or CMEA), founded in 1949 to oversee economic relations among socialist
countries, this iconic structure came to symbolize Soviet efforts to integrate
the socialist world. One can trace that familiar silhouette on letterhead stored
in archives from Hanoi to Havana, on medals and “friendship flags,” on
flashy posters and commemorative stamps, and on innumerable other objects
that circulated across continents.56 While shaped by the domestic policies of
55
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Concrete Symbol: The Comecon building in Moscow’s Arbat
Source: Arkhitektura SSSR, no. 4 (1966).
Stalinism and the Thaw, then, parts of Arbat’s urban profile also stood as an
unmistakable reference to a sprawling socialist world-system.57
Postwar international crosscurrents and socialist exchange were not
the same thing, though they were connected in important ways. Whether
formally or informally, postwar architectural exchange remained a distinctly
transnational affair. The novelty, as Stephen Kotkin has shown in an influential
essay published in this journal, was the creation of a new socialist arena,
stretching from the eastern regions of Europe to East Asia.58 In certain locales
of this vast territory prewar contacts survived and reemerged in the 1950s,
while elsewhere war displaced countless people, erased preexisting institutions,
and created new alignments. In East Germany, as Castillo demonstrates,
prewar and postwar spheres overlapped and often clashed. But in countries
“SEV: Sovetskii proekt ekonomicheskoi integratsii,” 29 April–28 June 2009, Rossiiskii
gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki (RGAE), Moscow.
57
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that were never integrated in the modernism of the interwar period (such
as, say, Albania), the socialist arena proved crucial for the construction of
professional and urban identities. The international dimension was always
present, therefore, but the fiercest professional struggles were often fought at
the Eastern bloc level.
Taking seriously the global pretensions of socialist states, György Péteri
has argued that “the communist project in Eastern Europe has been the
largest deliberately designed experiment in globalization in modern history.”59
Nurturing international ambitions, Soviet and Eastern bloc elites were conscious
of the superiority of their social mission, or what Péteri aptly calls “systemic
relativism,” meaning the essentially different and incommensurate nature of
state socialism with Western capitalism. But they also became painfully aware
of their poor economic and technological performance in relation to the West,
not merely in terms of growth rates and tons of coal or steel produced, but
essentially in terms of “the failure of state socialism to appropriate and adopt
the main tendencies of international technological development and their
failure to pioneer such changes.”60 Superiority and inferiority, then, combined
“to form the mentality of the communist elite and their seemingly capricious
oscillations between the extremes of offensive or defensive, integrationist or
isolationist policies.”61
Exchange was at the heart of this large-scale experiment in socialist
globalization. As both Bittner and Castillo suggest, technical inventions that
were not originally Soviet could be effectively appropriated and circulated
by a variety of Soviet and Eastern bloc agents and institutions. The Soviets
were directly in control of many facets of this exchange, but much of it
was also overseen by Eastern bloc authorities themselves.62 Momentous as
it was, however, socialist exchange did not necessarily bring more Eastern
bloc cohesion, strengthen political loyalty, or even, in certain cases, increase

59
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openness.63 In rediscovering this flow of ideas, peoples, and technology across
Cold War borders, it becomes necessary to spell out the conditions and
institutions that contributed to certain outcomes and not others. Nuanced
analyses of socialist exchange would also help us explain how the Eastern bloc
could seem both resilient and unstable.
One example that clearly manifested the contradictory nature of socialist
exchange was the fifth congress of the Union internationale des architectes
(the International Union of Architects, UIA), held in Moscow in 1958.
Founded in 1948 in Lausanne, Switzerland, the UIA attempted to unite all
international architectural organizations into one body—a kind of United
Nations of architects.64 Like CIAM, the UIA was rooted in preexisting
professional networks and international contacts: the British planner Sir
Patrick Abercrombie; the Swiss Jean Tschumi; the Hungarian-born expatriate
Ernö Goldfinger; the American Ralph Walker; the Russian Nicolas Baranov;
and the illustrious, if formal, presence of Auguste Perret.65 The organization
found its energetic spokesman in Pierre Vago, an enterprising architect born
in Budapest to József Vágó (associated with the League of Nations building
in Geneva) and who became a founding editor of the influential journal
L’Architecture d’aujourd’hui.66 After CIAM rejected an invitation to join
ranks, the UIA developed as a bureaucratic structure encompassing national
professional associations with sections devoted to Western and Eastern
Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Africa. As Vago would later put it, the goal
was to form an organization that was neither “elitist” nor “dogmatic like
CIAM.”67
Even though Vago and his associates were committed to taking politics
out of international architectural gatherings, Cold War tensions nevertheless
seeped in.68 Preparations for the 1958 Moscow congress, for example, were
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jeopardized by the Soviet and Eastern bloc invasion of Budapest in November
1956. The Egyptian section also filed a complaint letter with the UIA in
December, denouncing the British and French attacks against Port Said.69
Vago immediately flew to Moscow to get assurances from Soviet authorities
that the congress would be free of politics.70 The Soviets were willing to oblige,
deeming the congress a valuable opportunity to showcase postwar Soviet
planning achievements. Accordingly, Soviet authorities mobilized planning
bureaucrats and issued invitations around the world.71 By special permission
from the CPSU, the congress was held within the Kremlin from 21 to 27 July,
and guests were treated to waltzes played by a Red Army orchestra, tours of
the Lenin mausoleum, and a visit to a prefab panel factory.72 All in all, some
1,400 delegates came to Moscow, representing more than 40 countries.73 In
addition to large Soviet, Eastern bloc, and French contingents, Latin America
was also heavily represented, with Colombia and Mexico sending 81 and 148
delegates, respectively.74
The chosen theme of the congress (“Construction and Reconstruction
of Towns, 1945–57”) resonated both with postwar socialist planners as
well as delegations from the “developing world.”75 Even though discussants
reiterated familiar arguments about the aesthetic and functional aspects of
urban planning, one particular concern emerged across Cold War lines:
monotony. Architects around the globe, the meeting’s resolution proclaimed,
were enthusiastically embracing industrial building methods and more
rational planning techniques. Yet these same techniques could easily result
in uniform urban profiles. The resolution did not explicitly argue against
monumentality in urban planning, an issue that had preoccupied CIAM
for decades, but merely pointed out that “the goal in designing housing
and public centers should be the creation of possibilities for decent human
69
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living.”76 It concluded with a general call to “cooperation” among countries
and a reference to peace. But what exactly was “decent human living”? And
how could monotony be avoided? The resolution similarly avoided questions
of property and economic planning, and it did not explicitly outline the
characteristics of the “new aesthetics” of industrially built cities. Underlying
a seemingly universal agreement on industrial building methods, then, were
unresolved questions and fundamental divergences. In their final report, for
example, the East German delegates wrote that there could be no industrial
solution to urban problems in the West as long as there was private property
and a market economy.77
A number of other ideological clashes betrayed the unofficial symbol
of the gathering—the ubiquitous white dove. At one point, some delegates
brought forward a motion to adopt the Stockholm petition on nuclear
disarmament (based on the 1950 Stockholm Peace Appeal originally
formulated by Ilya Ehrenburg). The congress initially adopted it, but before
Soviet officials had any chance to run with the headline, UIA executives
canceled the motion.78 On another occasion, Poland’s Helena Syrkus urged
fellow architects to “break the silence” and reintroduce the human scale in
architecture.79 More conspicuously, Jean Tschumi of Switzerland and Jean
Fayeton of France took issue with Soviet architecture in their speeches.80
Curiously, Soviet officials seemed willing to admit to past planning errors. On
the question of monumentality in Moscow, for example, the architect Karo
Alabian, author of the Central Theater of the Red Army and secretary of the
Soviet Union of Architects, readily acknowledged the architectural excesses of
the period between 1935 and 1956. Although some UIA officials’ accounts
tend to smooth over these confrontations, notes kept by the East Germans
indicate that delegates divided themselves along Cold War lines.81 Indeed,
76
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Soviet and Bulgarian representatives took the floor “on behalf ” of the socialist
countries while the Dutch, French, British, and West Germans spoke for “the
West.”82 Speaking time was also allocated to China, as well as Chile (for Latin
America) and the U.S. delegation (for North America).
Records of private meetings between Soviet and East German planners
also bring to light the tensions that permeated Eastern bloc professional
elites in the aftermath of the Soviet Thaw.83 On 26 July, the East German
delegation—which consisted of Walter Pisternik, Kurt Liebknecht, Edmund
Collein, and Gerhard Kosel—met with Alabian and Ivan Aleksandrovich
Grishmanov, head of the CPSU Central Committee’s Department of
Construction.84 As outlined in reports filed by Liebknecht and Kosel, the
East Germans were eager to raise a number of questions and concerns about
the future of socialist architecture. They claimed, for example, that the
Soviet response to the French delegates’ criticism had been lukewarm. Soviet
design projects exhibited at the congress had struck Liebknecht as inspired
by “fashionable Western architecture.” Yet another point of concern was
a speech by the chief of the Institute of History and Theory at the Soviet
Academy of Construction and Architecture, in which he had spoken about
“an architecture for the 20th century” without even mentioning social classes.
In laying out these concerns, the East Germans seemed to take on the role of
spokesmen for the Eastern bloc. They appeared anxious, for example, about
Western cultural influences in Hungary after 1956 and warned that there
could be no coexistence between Western and socialist architecture.
While admitting that he had not properly responded to the French
accusations, Alabian nevertheless pointed out that the Soviets themselves
had acknowledged the architectural excesses of the Stalin era. Still, nobody
could actually deny the obvious differences between socialist and capitalist
urban planning, he noted. A simple comparison between Moscow and
82
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Khrushchev and the Architects: The Soviet leader speaks to participants at
the congress of the International Union of Architects, Moscow, July 1958
Source: Arkhitektura SSSR, no. 8 (1958).
London would suffice. The socialist city, Alabian went on, would have
to be built around a “social core,” not merely parks and trees encircling
private businesses. As for the elements of the “architecture for the 20th
century,” as well as how this related to “national forms,” he merely admitted
that the issue was complicated. Certainly, the point was not to paste
some “national” pastiche on façades. (As an example, Alabian brought up
Armenian architects who had reportedly carved religious elements on the
panels of modern housing blocks.) Simplicity, he insisted, could also serve
as “a national form.” Although Alabian concurred that a tough stance on
Western architecture was necessary, he also deemed the UIA of “colossal
political importance,” especially given the tendency in South American
architectural circles to challenge American planning models. In conclusion,
participants agreed to call a meeting among socialist countries to clarify
further the issues related to socialist architecture.85
The day before Alabian and Grishmanov met with the East Germans,
Khrushchev attended a meeting of the UIA executive board, where he criticized
the strong influence of classical Greek and Roman architecture in the Soviet
Union. Roman architects, he asserted, were geniuses who built palaces for the
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wealthy. But social relations under socialism were of a wholly different nature,
and economic calculations were at the heart of central planning. Stalin-era
Soviet architects, Khrushchev complained, had adorned even cowsheds with
columns. Nevertheless, the Soviet leader drew a line between socialist planning
and Western modernism. “We do not want to build cities filled with boxes,
as the French architect Le Corbusier recommends,” he said, “which is to say
that we do not want to simplify things.”86 The Soviet Union did not need
30-story buildings or long silhouettes because people could not take shelter
in silhouettes. There were a few things Soviet planners could learn from the
West, he acknowledged, but when it came to housing, the West had produced
little innovation since World War II. In conclusion, while admitting that there
was no such thing as a rigid socialist form, Khrushchev argued that socialist
architecture was created by the convergence of a certain calculus of cost and
the overriding principle of serving the people.87
These seemingly minor incidents and exchanges in Moscow in 1958
encapsulated many of the overlapping dilemmas of the Soviet Thaw. Above
all, they exposed generational and personal conflicts within the planning
profession (similar to the generational battles that Bittner identifies at the
Gnesin Institute or among Moscow planners). Whereas Liebknecht was
personally invested in the previous denunciation of “formalism,” Gerhard
Kosel was firmly committed to the prospects of industrialized construction
and prefabrication technology.88 If Liebknecht stood for socialist realism, Kosel
emerged as the chief architect of Eastern bloc-wide exchange in industrial
building methods.89 Later that year, he was handpicked to lead the Comecon’s
Berlin-based permanent commission on construction, whose task was to
oversee the exchange of construction technology and architectural standards
among member states.90 Personal ambition, in short, was deeply interwoven
with evolving debates at the national, Eastern bloc, and international levels.91
In addition to highlighting the international horizon in which postwar
architectural discussions were carried out, these exchanges reveal the self86
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induced anxiety pervading the socialist world system. That anxiety was
rooted not merely in the abandonment of one style for another but in the
understanding that socialist planning was part of a much larger dynamic
of power and control, as argued convincingly by both Bittner and Castillo.
The 1958 Moscow episodes also point to the fact that the appropriation of
Soviet practices in the cultural realm was often more subtle than direct orders,
and that avenues of influence were equally shaped by Eastern bloc actors,
local interests, and daily power struggles. Finally, the exchanges between the
Soviets and the East Germans in Moscow openly acknowledged the daunting
competition in architecture, urban planning, and material culture with the
capitalist West. Even if such a thing as “socialist design” could not be readily
defined, as Khrushchev acknowledged in front of his guests at the Kremlin, it
had to be invented merely for the purpose of distinguishing it from Western
architectural and urban forms. East German architects heavily criticized
international “star architects” yet they could barely conceal their obsession
with Western architecture.92 Geographical proximity to the West certainly
shaped this outlook, but the East German anxieties were also shared across
the Eastern bloc. Architects and planners embodied the paradox of “socialist
design”: their blueprints “cut through the face of doubt,” as Konrád’s unnamed
city builder boasted, yet self-induced doubt came back to haunt them, just as
it kept haunting him, again and again.93
Harriman Institute
Columbia University
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027 USA
em2886@columbia.edu

92

The East German delegation, for example, passionately denounced the Interbau, a
development project for the Hansaviertel in West Berlin, featuring the designs of Le Corbusier
and Walter Gropius. On Interbau’s impact on East German planners, see Castillo, Cold War
on the Home Front, 182–88.
93
Konrád, The City Builder, 90.

